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INTRODUCTION
On April 20, 2010, an explosion at BP p.l.c.’s (“BP”) Deepwater Horizon oil rig (the “Rig”) caused a massive oil gush 5000 feet below sea level,
resulting in the largest environmental disaster in United States history and
the largest oil-related disaster in the world.1 As a result of the explosion,
eleven workers were killed, seventeen others were seriously injured,2 and
thousands more in the Gulf area suffered, and continue to suffer, financial
losses. The extensive scope of the injuries and economic losses has led to
1. David J. Cook, Class Actions and the Limits of Recovery: The Glass Jaw of Justice
(Part 1 of 2), J. LEGAL. TECH. RISK MGMT., Fall 2010, at 1.
2. Verified Amended Shareholder Derivative Complaint at 53, Lampers v. Hayward,
No. 2:10-cv-01446 (E.D. La. Aug. 19, 2010), ECF No. 58.
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the filing of thousands of claims and hundreds of class actions against BP
and other potentially responsible parties for economic damages, environmental cleanup costs, and other losses.3 BP insiders, including Anthony B.
Hayward, the former Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of BP and former
Executive Director of the Board of Directors, face numerous derivative liability suits for breach of fiduciary duties to the company and its shareholders.4 Transocean Ltd., the company that owned and operated the Rig,
which it leased to BP, also faces liability for the disaster.5 In addition, Cameron International Corporation (“Cameron”), the company that manufactured the blowout preventer that failed to function on the Rig, is confronted
with potential liability.6 Lastly, Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. (“Halliburton”), a subcontractor to the Rig and the company that was servicing the
cement casing meant to seal the wellhead to the sea floor, faces extensive
liability claims for its part in the disaster.7
In response to the onslaught of claims and pressure from President Obama, BP agreed to place $20 billion into an escrow account (the “BP Oil
Spill Fund” or “Fund”) to pay damage claims.8 Claimants who choose to
recover from the BP Oil Spill Fund must, in exchange for compensation,
waive their rights to pursue claims against both BP and others, including
Halliburton and Cameron.9 The question arises: is it fair to release BP
from liability in exchange for its contribution of $20 billion?
Some argue that without the BP Oil Spill Fund, BP would be embroiled
in litigation with tort claimants for years to come, and the success of the
company would be severely in question. The Fund also enables claimants
to be compensated far more quickly than they otherwise would be if they
were required to obtain a judgment in court. For many Gulf residents, receiving compensation now is imperative, as they cannot afford to wait for
their claims to take the inevitably lengthy route through the traditional judicial system. While the Fund offers several benefits, with BP paying the
vast majority of these claims, what justification can there be for releasing
BP’s insiders, Halliburton, and others from liability?
Although BP did not enter bankruptcy, the BP Oil Spill Fund and the
proposed releases of BP, BP’s insiders, and other potentially liable compa3. Cook, supra note 1, at 1; Stephen Gidiere et al., The Coming Wave of Gulf Coast Oil
Spill Litigation, 71 ALA. LAW. 374, 379 (Sept. 2010).
4. See Verified Amended Shareholder Derivative Complaint, supra note 2, at 9-10.
5. See id. at 17.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. Jackie Calmes & Helene Cooper, BP to Set Aside $20 Billion To Help Oil Spill Victims, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2010, at A18.
9. Cook, supra note 1, at 2; Gidiere et al., supra note 3.
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nies parallel many of the issues faced by bankruptcy courts assessing Chapter 11 plans. Bankruptcy courts have long struggled with the question of
whether a Chapter 11 plan can contain a provision releasing the liabilities
of, or grant injunctions preventing claims from being asserted against, parties other than the debtor, including insiders of the debtor and others entities tangentially related to the debtor, namely insurance companies.10
This Note will argue that the power of bankruptcy courts to grant nondebtor third party releases and injunctions should be carefully limited. As
the BP case illustrates, there are significant benefits to the creation of a
claimants trust, both for the company and claimants. Claimants trusts most
often arise in the bankruptcy context in cases where the debtor faces mass
tort claims or securities class actions.11 In these cases, the debtor’s insurer
often agrees to make a contribution to the fund or to channel proceeds of
the insurance policy into a fund in exchange for a release from future liability and an injunction barring future action by claimants against the insurer.
This Note will argue that bankruptcy courts should continue to grant releases and injunctions in exchange for the insurer’s substantial contribution
to the plan of reorganization when the debtor is faced with class action or
mass tort litigation that threatens to upend any efforts to reorganize the
debtor. The insurer’s contribution to a claimants trust can aid the debtor’s
reorganization because the debtor can avoid time-consuming litigation with
the insurer over the scope of the insurance policy, the cost of which would
deplete assets of the estate. These assets will instead be available to creditors. Insurer releases and injunctions in exchange for channeling insurance
proceeds into a fund may further promote the fair and equitable distribution
of assets to creditors because the proceeds will be distributed under the supervision of the bankruptcy court, as opposed to the state law rule of firstcome, first-served that leaves some creditors paid in full and others with
little or no compensation.
Recent developments in the Chapter 11 process have important implications for whether courts should grant releases to another type of nondebtor
third party—insiders of the debtor.12 In the past, many courts were willing
to grant insider releases or injunctions based on various theories, including
the need to obtain the insider’s assistance and cooperation with the reorganization, the debtor’s need to obtain the release of the insider’s indemnity or
contribution claims against the debtor, and the need to secure monetary
contributions from the insider to the plan of reorganization.13 This Note
10.
11.
12.
13.

See infra Part II.A.
See cases cited infra note 198 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
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will argue that recent shifts towards pre-arranged bankruptcies and the increased use of turnaround specialists render at least two of these justifications moot.14 These changes to the traditional Chapter 11 proceeding indicate that large corporate debtors do not view existing management as
integral to the reorganization of the debtor, and that it is, therefore, unnecessary to provide the insiders with releases or permanent injunctions. Securing existing management’s cooperation and assistance is no longer, and
may never have been, a valid reason for granting a release or an injunction.15 In addition, since corporations more and more frequently replace
existing management, the need to grant a release in exchange for the insider’s contribution of new value to induce the insider to retain an equity interest in the reorganized entity is also no longer a valid justification.16
Lastly, as some commentators have argued, the debtor’s need to obtain releases from insiders’ indemnification and contribution claims is an illusory
argument that courts have too often accepted without question.17
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I addresses the history of nondebtor releases and injunctions, the origins of bankruptcy courts’ jurisdictional powers, the traditional and more unique ways in which bankruptcy
courts interpret and exercise this power, and the policy goals behind Chapter 11. Part II explores seminal decisions on whether bankruptcy courts
have the power to grant nondebtor third party releases and injunctions. It
also lays out the main arguments asserted by both courts and scholars on
both sides of the argument. Lastly, Part III sets forth my argument that
courts should never grant permanent releases to insiders and only under
rare circumstances, to the debtor’s insurers.
I. THE HISTORY OF NONDEBTOR RELEASES AND INJUNCTIONS
In a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, one of the main policy goals includes successful reorganization of a debtor with going concern value and fair and
equitable distribution to creditors.18 Deciding when a debtor has going
concern value is a matter left to the court’s discretion. Some argue that the

14. See discussion infra Part III.B.
15. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
16. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
17. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
18. See, e.g., Barry L. Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds in Bankruptcy, 55 BROOK. L. REV.
373, 377 (1989) [hereinafter Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds] (explaining that Chapter 11
aims to maximize the amount that creditors recover and to distribute assets among creditors
equally). Additional policy goals also exist. See H.R. REP. NO. 595, at 220 (1977), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179 (legislative history shows that Congress intended the
Code to enable reorganization of the debtor so that it could continue to employ its workers,
satisfy its debts to creditors, and yield a return to shareholders).
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assets of firms with revenues falling below nonfinancing costs should be
sold off because the assets are better put to use elsewhere.19 Insolvent
firms with revenues in excess of production costs, but that are unable to
pay the firm’s debt, should continue as going concerns.20 The capital structure of the firm should be restructured to allow the firm to function under
less leverage.21
Issues arise because individual creditors have the incentive to attempt to
grab assets of the firm—to liquidate the firm piecemeal—in order to satisfy
their own claims.22 This incentive is present whether or not it is more efficient to reorganize the firm.23 As a group, however, creditors have the incentive to allow the firm to reorganize when it will result in greater value
than would result from liquidation.24 The bankruptcy system attempts to
solve this coordination problem among creditors through mechanisms that
disable creditors from racing to collect on their individual claims and also
determine the means of producing the most value from the firm, either
through reorganization or through liquidation.25
A.

Basics of a Chapter 11 Proceeding

This Note will focus on Chapter 11 reorganizations; therefore, a cursory
explanation of the bankruptcy process under this title may be of use. Unlike a Chapter 7 case, in which the debtor’s assets are liquidated and
proceeds are distributed to its creditors on a pro rata basis,26 a debtor in
Chapter 11 continues to operate while attempting to reorganize itself.27
Creditor claims will be satisfied under the reorganization plan typically
through current assets as well as future earnings of the reorganized debtor.28

19. Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J.
1807, 1807 (1998). This is often referred to as “piecemeal liquidation.” See Barry E. Adler,
A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 343, 360 n.62 (1997).
20. See Schwartz, supra note 19.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1807-09 (“Business bankruptcy systems attempt to solve a coordination problem for the creditors of insolvent firms.”); see also Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra
note 18, at 377-78 (explaining that the collective nature of bankruptcy proceedings avoids a
race to the debtor’s assets that results in some creditors being paid in full and some creditors
receiving only partial or no payment on their debts).
26. See Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 18, at 377.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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Bankruptcy Courts’ Traditional Exercise of Jurisdiction Under
Chapter 11

Upon filing of the petition, the debtor’s legal and equitable interests become property of the estate.29 The Bankruptcy Code’s definition of property of the estate is intentionally broad.30 Congress wanted to give the bankruptcy trustee control over as much of the debtor’s assets as possible in
order to maximize the assets available for distribution to creditors.31 The
definition of property of the estate is also intentionally broad in order to
bring property that is best administered in a collective proceeding into the
estate.32
In addition, a stay is instituted that prevents actions against the debtor
and against the property of the estate for the duration of the proceeding.33
This automatic stay provides the debtor with “a breathing spell from his
creditors.”34 It also helps to ensure the equitable distribution of the debtor’s assets among creditors.
The automatic stay contemplates actions against the debtor and the property of the estate; therefore, co-debtors or other third party debtors are generally not given protection under this provision.35 Because the automatic
stay does not protect these parties, claimants often attempt to collect from
these entities when they are prevented from pursuing the debtor.36 In these
instances, the bankruptcy court exercises a less traditional jurisdictional
power, explored in Part I.A.2, by drawing on its section 105 powers, which
give the court the power to take any action “necessary or appropriate” to
carry out the provisions of the Code.37
Another benefit to a debtor of Chapter 11 is that upon confirmation of
the plan, section 1141(d)(1) discharges the debtor from any debt that arose
29. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006) (debtor’s estate includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case”).
30. H.R. REP. NO. 595, at 367 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963.
31. Id. at 175-76.
32. See Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 18, at 387-88. As discussed below,
the definition of property of the estate has great impact on the position of third party nondebtors. See infra notes 169-174 and accompanying text. For example, disagreement as to
whether insurance proceeds are considered “property of the estate” has implications for
whether the bankruptcy court has power over the property in order to distribute the proceeds
to creditors. See Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 18, at 378-79.
33. See 11 U.S.C. § 362.
34. H.R. REP. NO. 595, at 340.
35. 11 U.S.C. § 362; see Barry L. Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy,
73 CORNELL L. REV. 213, 217 (1988) [hereinafter Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays] (explaining
that by its language, section 362 applies only to debtors).
36. See Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 18, at 383.
37. See 11 U.S.C. § 105.
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before the date of the confirmation.38 This is a powerful tool for the debtor
because the statute indicates that claims are dischargeable whether or not
proof of claim is filed, the claim is allowed, or the claimant has voted in favor of the plan.39 In addition to requesting temporary stays, analogous to
the automatic stay provided to the debtor, nondebtor third parties sometimes also request permanent injunctions or releases, similar to the discharge provided to debtors under section 1141(d)(1). However, because
the language of section 1141(d)(1) refers only to debtors, bankruptcy courts
must find their power to grant permanent injunctions on behalf of nondebtor third parties elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code. The justifications used
by bankruptcy courts to extend permanent injunctions and releases to nondebtor third parties vary greatly and are discussed in the next section.
2.

Bankruptcy Courts’ Equitable Powers Under Section 105

Bankruptcy courts may exercise control over property that is not considered “property of the estate” and is, therefore, not covered by the section
362 automatic stay. A trustee or debtor may seek an injunction under the
court’s section 105 equitable powers.40 There are two types of injunctions
under section 105, temporary41 and permanent.42
Section 105 gives bankruptcy courts the power to enact discretionary
stays.43 Unlike the automatic stay, a request for relief under section 105
must typically meet the traditional requirements for an injunction.44 Courts
will consider whether the party seeking a preliminary injunction is likely to
succeed on the merits, whether irreparable harm is likely if preliminary relief is denied, whether the balance of equities tips in the moving party’s favor, and whether the injunction is in the public interest.45 The court need
not consider all of the factors; if one is particularly strong, the court may

38. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (granting discharge to debtors that are not individuals).
39. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1141.05 (16th ed. 2009).
40. See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (a bankruptcy court may take any action “necessary or appropriate” to effect the provisions of the Code); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, ¶
105.04 (“The most notorious use of section 105 has been to seek to enjoin actions which, for
one reason or another, are not stayed by the automatic stay of section 362.”).
41. Temporary injunctions are also referred to as “preconfirmation injunctions” or
“temporary stays.”
42. Permanent injunctions are also referred to as “postconfirmation injunctions.” It is
important to note that in the context of Chapter 11 cases, the injunction is typically temporary, meaning it carries on only for the duration of the bankruptcy proceeding. See Zaretsky,
Insurance Proceeds, supra note 18, at 400.
43. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, ¶ 105.03.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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issue or deny an injunction based upon that factor alone.46 Some courts
have reformulated this traditional test to comport with the language of section 105 by removing the factors relating to irreparable harm and lack of an
adequate remedy at law.47 The revised test requires that there be: first, a
danger of irreparable harm to the estate or the debtor’s ability to reorganize; second, a reasonable likelihood of reorganization; third, a balance of
the relative harm between the debtor and the creditor who would be restrained; and fourth, consideration of whether the injunction is in the public
interest.48
For permanent injunctions, the tests that courts employ also vary. Some
courts ask if the injunction requested is “necessary or appropriate to carry
out” the discharge provisions of Chapter 11.49 Other courts approve releases only if the affected creditors and parties consent.50 One of the most authoritative tests, the Master Mortgage test, includes five factors: first, there
must be an identity of interest between the debtor and the third party such
that a suit against the third party is, in essence, a suit against the debtor or
will deplete assets of the estate; second, the third party must contribute
“substantial assets” to the reorganization; third, the success of the plan
must hinge on granting the release; fourth, a substantial majority of the
creditors must agree to the release; and finally, the plan must provide for
payment of all or substantially all of the claims of the classes affected by
the third party release.51
There are definite limits to courts’ section 105 powers. A Chapter 11
plan of reorganization may only be confirmed if the court finds it complies
with all provisions of the Code;52 therefore, a court cannot confirm a plan
containing a third party discharge unless it conforms with all applicable
provisions. Thus, as the Supreme Court has held: “[W]hatever equitable
powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised
within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.”53 Although bankruptcy
courts are courts of equity, the power to issue injunctive relief under section 105 is limited to matters within the confines of the Code.54

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.; see, e.g., In re Monroe Well Serv., Inc., 67 B.R. 746, 752-54 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1986).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, ¶ 105.04.
50. See, e.g., In re DBSD N. Am., Inc. 419 B.R. 179 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
51. See In re Master Mortg. Inv. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 936 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994).
52. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1).
53. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988).
54. See Howard C. Buschman III, The Power and Propriety of Bankruptcy Court Intervention in Actions Between Nondebtors, 47 BUS. LAW 913, 922 (1992).
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Which Nondebtor Third Parties Request Releases and
Injunctions?

When a debtor files a Chapter 11 petition, various parties associated with
the debtor seek the benefits of the bankruptcy proceeding, including temporary and permanent injunctions and releases. Nondebtor third parties in the
bankruptcy context consist mainly of insiders of the debtor and the debtor’s
insurers. Insiders of the debtor, including directors and officers, often seek
protection from the bankruptcy courts even though they themselves have
not filed for bankruptcy.55 A debtor’s insurers will frequently seek releases
or injunctions in exchange for contributions to the plan or, in the case of a
bankruptcy precipitated by mass tort claims, a trust upon which the tort
claimants may draw.56
II. SEMINAL DECISIONS AND REASONS FOR AND AGAINST NONDEBTOR
THIRD PARTY RELEASES AND INJUNCTIONS
This part explores the seminal decisions of both “pro-release” and “antirelease” courts. Since the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction is limited by statute,57 pro-release courts rely on several provisions in the Bankruptcy
Code58 and the Bankruptcy Rules59 in approving Chapter 11 plans containing these releases and injunctions. Anti-release courts point instead to a
provision of the Bankruptcy Code that states, “[D]ischarge of a debt of the

55. See, e.g., SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc.), 130 B.R. 910, 913-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992)
(allowing releases of most of the securities claims asserted against debtor’s directors and
officers).
56. See, e.g., Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A. H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir.
1989); MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89,
91 (2d Cir. 1988).
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2006).
58. As discussed supra in Part I.A.2, the courts use their equitable powers under section
105 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2006) (“The court may issue any order,
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this
title.”). In addition, pro-release courts rely on section 1123(b)(6), which, like section 105,
has been construed to broaden the courts jurisdictional power. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(6)
(2006). In laying out contents of a plan, this provision states, “[s]ubject to subsection (a) of
this section, a plan may—(6) include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with
the applicable provisions of this title.” Id.
59. Pro-release courts point to Bankruptcy Rule 3016(c) as support that Congress contemplated bankruptcy courts’ exercising jurisdiction over nondebtor releases and injunctions. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3016(c) (stating that if a plan provides for an injunction not specifically authorized in the Code, such provision and the affected parties must be identified in
the plan and disclosure statement).
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debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of
any other entity for, such debt.”60
Part II then discusses the reasons that have been asserted by courts and
scholars for and against granting releases to insiders61 and debtors’ insurers.62
A.

Judicial Disagreement on the Treatment of Nondebtor Third
Party Releases and Injunctions in Chapter 11 Plans

Courts are divided on whether bankruptcy courts have the power to grant
nondebtor third party releases and injunctions.63 Although some circuits
have shown more willingness than others to grant nondebtor third party releases, there is not a strict divide. The Second Circuit, for example, has
produced some of the most creative solutions to settling mass tort litigation
in bankruptcy by granting permanent releases and injunctions to nondebtor
third parties.64 On the other hand, the Second Circuit has criticized releases
to nondebtor third parties in at least one case because the bankruptcy court
failed to find that the release was essential to the success of the plan.65
This tension, even within each circuit, is instructive. Far from being contradictory, these varying opinions indicate that the courts are struggling to
articulate a seamless policy that underlies their decisions in varying circumstances to grant or deny releases to nondebtor third parties. Part III
will attempt to elucidate this underlying policy; but first, some of the seminal decisions in this area of law are discussed.
1.

Seminal Pro-Release Decisions

Pro-release courts reason that section 105 grants bankruptcy courts
equitable powers, and that these powers are not constrained by the lan-

60. 11 U.S.C. § 524(e).
61. See infra Part II.B.1.
62. See infra Part II.B.2.
63. Compare SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc.), 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 1992) (approving bankruptcy courts’ power to
grant injunction to nondebtor third party), with Resorts Int’l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re
Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the Ninth Circuit has
repeatedly held that bankruptcy courts do not have the power to discharge the liabilities of
nondebtor third parties).
64. See MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d
89, 91 (2d Cir. 1988).
65. See Deutsche Bank AG v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. (In re Metromedia Fiber
Network, Inc.), 416 F.3d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 2005) (affirming confirmation regardless of this
oversight because the appeal was equitably moot as no stay of the confirmation order was
obtained).
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guage of section 524(e) so long as the enjoining of claims is essential to the
reorganization of the debtor.66 It is important to note, however, that the
more permissive views of the Second and Fourth Circuits discussed below
have not generally been construed by courts to give them “unfettered discretion to discharge non-debtors from liability.”67
a.

In re Johns-Manville Corp.

One of the leading pro-release decisions comes from the Second Circuit.68 Johns-Manville Corporation (“Johns-Manville” or “Manville”) produced products containing asbestos and faced numerous product liability
lawsuits by asbestos health claimants.69 Manville believed that its insurance would indemnify it against asbestos liability and defense costs, but
Manville’s insurers disagreed, launching Manville into costly litigation
with its insurers over the scope of the policies.70 This litigation, in addition
to several large liability awards and studies estimating that Manville faced
$1.9 billion in liability from over 52,000 asbestos claims, led Manville to
file for Chapter 11.71
In the plan of reorganization, Manville’s insurance companies agreed to
pay $770 million in exchange for releases from future liability and an injunction against all future suits.72 Claims were not extinguished, but rather
were channeled into a trust for successful claimants.73 The court relied in
part on section 363(f), which permits the sale of estate property “free and
clear” of any third party interest such as a lien in certain circumstances.74
The court reasoned that the insurance policies belonged to the estate, and
thus that section 363(f) allowed the court to dispose of the insurance

66. See, e.g, In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 960 F.2d at 293 (“In bankruptcy
cases, a court may enjoin a creditor from suing a third party, provided the injunction plays
an important part in the debtor’s reorganization plan.”); Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.
H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 702 (4th Cir. 1989).
67. See LTV Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 167 B.R. 776,
780 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that bankruptcy courts have granted permanent injunctions to
nondebtor third parties only when essential to plan confirmation).
68. See Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d 89.
69. See Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 18, at 405 n.77 (citing Johns-Manville
Corp., 837 F.2d at 91) (approximately 17,000 suits were pending against Manville by 1982).
70. See Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 18, at 405.
71. Id. at 405-06.
72. Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 90.
73. Id. at 91.
74. Id. at 93-94; see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006) (outlining the circumstances under
which the trustee may sell property of the estate “free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate”).
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proceeds through the settlement trusts and channel the claims to the
trusts.75
b.

In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.

In the bankruptcy of Drexel Burnham Lambert Group (“Drexel Burnham” or “Drexel”), the Second Circuit allowed releases of most of the securities claims against the debtor’s directors and officers.76 The Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) had filed a civil enforcement action
against Drexel Burnham and several of its high-level employees, including
Michael Milken (“Milken”), head of the High Yield and Convertible Bond
Department, based on massive securities fraud allegations stemming from
illegal activities of Milken and other Drexel employees in the junk bond
market.77 Drexel Burnham agreed to settle the SEC action by paying $350
million into a civil disgorgement fund, which would be used to satisfy the
securities claims.78 Milken also agreed to settle the SEC action by paying
$400 million into the fund.79 Drexel’s plan of reorganization released Milken and approximately two hundred other employees from all personal liability.80 As part of the plan confirmation, creditors filing claims against
Drexel for securities law violations were certified as a class.81 The securities litigation claimants were not provided with an option to opt out of the
settlement.82 In approving the settlement, the lower court reasoned that estimating the claims could take years, deplete the estate’s assets, and burden
the court system, and that without the settlement “there could be no Plan
and indeed, no successful and prompt resolution of these Chapter 11 cases.”83 The court also reasoned that the settlement would facilitate cooperation between the debtor and its employees, induce the debtor’s directors
and officers to settle certain claims with the debtors, which would provide

75. Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 94 (noting that it was not exactly the same, but
“the underlying principle of preserving the debtor’s estate for the creditors and funneling
claims to one proceeding in the bankruptcy court remains the same”).
76. SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp.,
Inc.), 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992).
77. Id. at 287-88; SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham
Lambert Grp., Inc.), 130 B.R. 910, 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992);
see also Ralph Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions and Complex Litigation: A Critical Reappraisal of Non-Debtor Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 959,
961-62 (1997) [hereinafter Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions].
78. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 130 B.R. at 913.
79. Id.
80. See Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions, supra note 77, at 962-63.
81. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 130 B.R. at 912, 923-24.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 926-27.
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more funds for the reorganization, eliminate competition over particular assets, and protect the debtor’s estate by preventing indemnity claims that insiders would assert if they were sued by the securities claimants.84 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s holding, stating that “in
bankruptcy cases, a court may enjoin a creditor from suing a third party,
provided the injunction plays an important part in the debtor’s reorganization plan.”85 The court reasoned that the settlement “is unquestionably an
essential element of Drexel’s ultimate reorganization” because without it
the officers and directors were unlikely to settle.86 Despite Milken’s contributions to the settlement fund, Milken retained substantial personal
wealth.87 In 2009, Milken ranked 158th on the Forbes list of the 400 richest Americans, with a net worth of approximately $2 billion.88
c.

In re A. H. Robins Co.

The Fourth Circuit granted releases to various nondebtor third parties in
the bankruptcy of the A. H. Robins Company (“A. H. Robins” or “Robins”).89 A. H. Robins manufactured the Dalkon Shield, a birth control device that was found to cause serious injuries to women who used it. In response to mounting litigation, A. H. Robins filed a Chapter 11 petition. A
number of parties were potentially jointly liable with A. H. Robins, including the officers and directors responsible for the company’s misconduct,
and Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (“Aetna”), the company’s prod-

84. Joshua M. Silverstein, Hiding in Plain View: A Neglected Supreme Court Decision
Resolves the Debate Over Non-Debtor Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 23 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 13, 69 (2006).
85. SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp.,
Inc.), 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 1992).
86. Id. This test, asking whether the release or injunction is essential to the reorganization of the debtor, is controlling in the Second Circuit. It is less demanding than the oftencited Master Mortgage test. See In re Master Mortg. Inv. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1994); see also supra text accompanying note 51.
87. See Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions, supra note 77, at 998 n.139.
88. See The 400 Richest Americans, FORBES.COM (Sept. 9, 2009), http://www.forbes.
com/lists/2009/54/rich-list-09_Michael-Milken_SSM6.html.
89. In re A. H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Ralph Brubaker,
Nondebtor Releases and Injunctions in Chapter 11: Revisiting Jurisdictional Precepts and
the Forgotten Callaway v. Benton Case, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 5 (1998) [hereinafter Brubaker, Nondebtor Releases] (explaining that nondebtor releases even precluded injured
women from suing their doctors for medical malpractice claims).
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uct liability insurer.90 The court granted a temporary injunction preventing
suits against these parties during the course of the reorganization.91
The plan had to take into account approximately 195,000 eligible claims,
not including future claims.92 Future claimants, though a larger issue in the
asbestos industry, also had to be contended with in the A. H. Robins case.
Approximately 3.6 million women used the Dalkon Shield worldwide,
many of them in Third World countries where Robins had not published
notices urging removal of the devices.93
Aetna’s potential liability was not limited to the remaining coverage under the insurance policies.94 Aetna was alleged to have conspired with
Robins to destroy documents that indicated that Robins knew of dangers
associated with the Dalkon Shield well before Robins finally warned doctors.95 It was also alleged that Aetna had commissioned and then concealed the results of studies questioning the safety of the Dalkon Shield.96
Lastly, some allegations arose that Aetna had played a major role in deciding not to issue a recall because it knew doing so would increase the number and value of Dalkon Shield injury claims.97 Women injured by the
Dalkon Shield, therefore, filed suit against Aetna on a theory of joint liability, claiming that their injuries could have been avoided by a prompt recall
of the device or a disclosure of the relevant facts.98

90. RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANK63 (1991).
91. Id. at 63-64. (“The primary reason put forward for this request was that the claims
against third parties were actually claims against Robins’s assets, either because the judgments would be satisfied through unused product liability insurance (Robins’s officers and
directors were insured persons under the company’s agreement with Aetna) or because Robins’s [sic] was contractually obligated to indemnify (reimburse) its officers and directors for
any liability imposed against them. Robins’s unused product liability insurance was an asset
of the estate, and if Dalkon Shield claimants could be paid out of insurance proceeds during
the bankruptcy, there would be unequal treatment of similarly situated creditors in violation
of one of the basic precepts of bankruptcy law. And even apart from the insurance, judgments against Robins’s officers and directors that resulted in claims for indemnity against
the company provided a mechanism for the liquidation of some Dalkon Shield injury claims
but not others outside the bankruptcy process.”).
92. Id. at 106.
93. Id. at 107.
94. Id. at 116.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. In prebankruptcy cases, Aetna either settled with claimants or the cases were
dismissed before trial on the narrow ground that an insurer does not owe a duty to consumers to disclose defects in the products it insures. Id. However, these did not address the other reasons for potential liability. Id.
98. Id.
RUPTCY
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Although Aetna maintained that it had no responsibility for the Dalkon
Shield injuries, the allegations were distressing to Aetna because they exposed Aetna to potential liability once Robins’ liability was discharged.99
Aetna was therefore willing to contribute to a fund to compensate Dalkon
Shield victims in exchange for protection from future liability. Aetna
agreed to pay $75 million in cash into a trust for the benefit of Dalkon
Shield victims.100 In addition, in exchange for a release from future liability, Aetna was willing to write two insurance policies: first, $100 million in
outlier insurance; and second, $250 million in excess insurance in the event
the trust was unable to pay all claims from the initial $75 million.101
In the Robins case, the issue arose as to whether tort claimants must be
given an opt-out provision that would let them waive any recovery from the
trust and bring their claims directly. Aetna was not opposed to a proposed
settlement that allowed claimants to opt out and pursue Aetna directly because the settlement would preclude the recovery of punitive damages, thereby reducing the intensity of the Dalkon Shield litigation.102 In addition,
the claimants trust would take care of most of the litigation, decreasing the
frequency of claims.103
The Robins case also dealt with the issue of whether insiders of the debtor could be granted releases from all future liability. Although legal proceedings related to A. H. Robins and Dalkon Shield had been stayed, one
proceeding, an investigation by the Department of Justice into possible
criminal activity by A. H. Robins’ officers and directors had not. A district
judge denied a motion by Robins to quash a subpoena issued by a grand
jury, explaining that there was substantial evidence that “Robins and its
employees and officers participated in the commission of crimes and fraud
during the promotion, marketing and sale of the Dalkon Shield, and used its
attorneys to perpetuate and cover-up [this conduct] through the commission
of frauds on the court, obstruction of justice, and perjury.”104 Since the
standard of proof is lower for civil liability, the officers and directors of
Robins were rightfully concerned that they would face liability once the
company was discharged.105 As part of the plan of reorganization, Robins
was to merge with a subsidiary of American Home Products, and the Rob-

99. Id. at 117.
100. In re A. H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 722 (4th Cir. 1989).
101. Id.
102. See SOBOL, supra note 90, at 218-19. The settlement depended on the judge’s willingness to certify a mandatory class for punitive damages. Id. at 250.
103. Id. at 219.
104. Id. at 220.
105. Id.

GAMBLE_CHRISTENSEN

4/9/2011 8:17 PM

2011]

NONDEBTOR RELEASES

837

ins family was expected to receive over $300 million in American Home
Products stock, so there would be assets from which claimants could recover.106 Although the insiders maintained that they were not liable, under
the settlement agreement, two members of the Robins family, both of
whom held senior management positions, agreed to personally make a
combined payment of $10 million to the trust in exchange for an injunction
and full release from all future tort liability.107 Although the claimants
committee was not pleased with the release, they decided to accept it because the value of the overall agreement with American Home Products
was worth it.108
In approving the plan, the court reasoned that the release was essential to
reorganization because it required the debtor to be free from indemnity and
contribution lawsuits that third parties would have brought had they been
sued by Dalkon Shield claimants. Creditors voted overwhelmingly in favor
of the plan, the plan provided Dalkon Shield claimants with the opportunity
to receive payment in full, and Aetna made substantial contributions to the
plan.109 Although the Fourth Circuit noted that the contribution of $10 million by the Robins family was only “minimal,” it still affirmed the settlement.110
2.

Seminal Anti-Release Decisions

Many courts refuse to approve Chapter 11 plans containing nondebtor
releases and injunctions.111 These courts reason that section 105 equitable

106. Id. at 221. American Home Products contributed $2.155 billion to the trust. Id. at
311. American Home Products was willing to do this because, as one drug analyst said at
the time, other profitable Robins products such as Robitussin and Chapstick made the acquisition the “steal of the century.” Id. at 334-35 (quoting Malcolm Gladwell, American
Home’s “Steal” of a Deal for A.H. Robins, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1989, at F1).
107. Id. at 221-22. Although the Robins family were named as defendants in the class
action and were granted nondebtor releases, the judicial approvals of the settlement do not
address their potential liability. See Brubaker, Nondebtor Releases, supra note 89, at 5 n.16
(citing Dalkon Shield Claimants’ Comm. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (In re A. H. Robins Co.),
88 B.R. 755, 758-63 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff’d, 880 F.2d 709, 748-52 (4th Cir. 1989); MenardSanford v. Mabey (In re A. H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 700-01 & n.6 (4th Cir. 1989)).
108. SOBOL, supra note 90, at 221.
109. See Silverstein, supra note 84, at 64.
110. A. H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 722 & n.15. The family received American Home Products stock worth $385 million as a tax-free distribution on their A. H. Robins stock under
the reorganization plan. See Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions, supra note 77, at 993 n.124.
111. See, e.g., Resorts Int’l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394,
1401 (9th Cir. 1995) (“This court has repeatedly held, without exception, that § 524(e) precludes bankruptcy courts from discharging the liabilities of nondebtors.”); Landsing Diversified Props. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. (In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 922 F.2d 592,
600 (10th Cir. 1990) (refusing to grant a permanent injunction that would relieve the third
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powers are limited by section 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that discharge of a debtor in bankruptcy does not affect the liability of
any other party.112
a.

In re American Hardwoods, Inc.

In the Chapter 11 case of American Hardwoods (“American”), the Ninth
Circuit denied a motion for a permanent injunction that would have barred
Deutsche Credit Corporation (“Deutsche”) from enforcing a state court
judgment against the Keelers, who as officers and shareholders of the debtor had personally guaranteed its debt to Deutsche.113 At no point did the
Keelers offer to contribute assets to American’s reorganization.114 American brought an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court, seeking both
a temporary and permanent injunction staying Deutsche’s efforts to enforce
the judgment against the Keelers.115 The bankruptcy court did temporarily
enjoin Deutsche from enforcing the state court judgment against the Keelers.116 However, the bankruptcy court found that while American’s reorganization plan would likely fail if the state court judgment against the
Keelers was enforced, the court did not have the power or jurisdiction to
grant a permanent injunction against Deutsche.117 The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s holding,118 rejecting American’s argument
that the bankruptcy court had power to permanently enjoin Deutsche pursuant to its section 105 powers.119 The Ninth Circuit, in affirming the holdings of both the bankruptcy court and district court, distinguished this case
from In re A. H. Robins Co., stating that there were no such unusual cirparty of liability to the creditor, reasoning “it is the debtor, who has invoked and submitted
to the bankruptcy process, that is entitled to its protections; Congress did not intend to extend such benefits to third-party bystanders”); Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit
Corp. (In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1989); Underhill v. Royal, 769
F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding release of debtor’s founder and other related parties from
all claims arising from notes executed by the debtor was unenforceable and eventually entering judgment against the debtor’s founder for securities law violations relating to the
note); Whispering Pines Estates, Inc. v. Flash Island, Inc. (In re Whispering Pines Estates,
Inc.), 370 B.R. 452 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2007) (reversing bankruptcy court order confirming
plan which included a release of the creditor who proposed the plan).
112. 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2006) (“Except as provided in subsection (a)(3) of this section,
discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the
property of any other entity for, such debt.”).
113. Am. Hardwoods, Inc., 885 F.2d at 622.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 622-23.
118. Id. at 623.
119. Id. at 624.
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cumstances here warranting the enjoining of claims against nondebtor third
parties.120 Unlike A. H. Robins, the Ninth Circuit noted that American did
not face mass tort claims estimated at almost $2.5 billion, the permanent
injunction was not overwhelmingly approved by American’s creditors as it
was by A. H. Robins’ creditors, and the injunction would affect American’s
largest creditor, not simply a small fraction of creditors as it had in the A.
H. Robins case.121 Lastly, the Ninth Circuit noted that American did not
propose, and the district court did not find, that the permanent injunction
was “essential” to a successful plan of reorganization, a factor on which the
A. H. Robins court relied heavily.122
b.

In re Continental Airlines

The Third Circuit rejected the use of nondebtor third party releases in the
reorganization of Continental Airlines (“Continental”).123 Directors and
officers of Continental faced several securities fraud class actions.124 Continental filed for Chapter 11 and the bankruptcy court temporarily enjoined
the class actions.125 Continental, its D&O liability insurers, and its directors and officers entered into a tripartite settlement by which each party released all others from liability.126 The D&O liability insurers also provided
$5 million to Continental to settle all claims and potential claims against
the directors and officers.127 Continental then filed a plan of reorganization
that contained provisions releasing and permanently enjoining claims
against the directors and officers, including those of the securities fraud
class action plaintiffs.128 The bankruptcy court approved the plan, and the
district court affirmed, explaining that the release and permanent injunction
of the lawsuits was a “key element” of the reorganization because Continental would have to indemnify its directors and officers, thereby diminishing assets of the estate.129 In addition, the district court reasoned that the
lawsuits would distract the reorganized debtor, but the court did not support
its conclusions with any factual evidence in the record.130 On appeal, the
120. Id. at 627.
121. Id. (citing Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A. H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694 (4th
Cir. 1989)).
122. Id. (citing A. H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d at 694).
123. Gillman v. Cont’l Airlines (In re Cont’l Airlines), 203 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2000).
124. Id. at 205.
125. Id. at 206.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 207-08.
130. See id. at 208.
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Third Circuit held that the release and permanent injunction of the lawsuits
were both “legally and factually insupportable.”131 It questioned the district court’s finding that the release and permanent injunction of claims
against the directors and officers were actually a key element of the reorganization, noting that federal courts often refuse to recognize indemnity
obligations for federal securities law violations.132 Even if the debtor were
to face indemnity obligations, however, the court found that these potential
future obligations did not make the release and permanent injunction “necessary” to the successful reorganization of the debtor.133 The court concluded that “granting permanent injunctions to protect non-debtor parties
on the basis of theoretical identity of interest alone would turn bankruptcy
principles on their head. Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code can be construed
to establish such extraordinary protection for non-debtor parties.”134
B.

Arguments for and Against Granting Nondebtor Releases and
Injunctions to Insiders and Insurers in Chapter 11 Plans

Nondebtor releases and injunctions are often requested by insiders of the
debtor or, particularly in mass tort cases, the debtor’s insurers. Many scholars have weighed in on both sides of this issue, as is discussed in this section.
1.

Should Insiders Be Granted Nondebtor Releases or Injunctions?

Insiders of the debtor include directors, officers, and other high-ranking
employees of the debtor. Officers and directors may agree not to assert a
claim against the debtor in exchange for a release from personal liability.
There are various ways in which insiders may be found personally liable.
Creditors or shareholders may assert a breach of fiduciary duty claim or attempt to pierce the corporate veil. With regards to tort liability, an insider
may have liability distinct from that of the debtor, because employees are
still directly liable for their own torts.
Those who benefit from this type of release are most likely the ones asserting that the debtor will be irreparably harmed without it, so courts have
held that, in order to prevent self-dealing, they will subject these claims to
rigorous scrutiny.135

131. Id. at 211-12.
132. See id. at 215-16.
133. See id. at 216 n.15.
134. See id. at 217.
135. See, e.g., Spach v. Bryant, 309 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962); Hopper v. Am. Nat’l Bank
(In re Smith-Chadderdon Buick, Inc.), 309 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1962).
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Arguments for Allowing Releases and Injunctions to Insiders

First, some argue that there is a need to obtain the release of insiders’ indemnity and contribution claims against the debtor. Debtors have argued
that suits against insiders will inevitably result in indemnity and contribution claims against the debtor and embroil the debtor in litigation.136
Granting these injunctions would prevent creditors from pressuring the
debtor through its insiders. It would prevent creditors from “doing indirectly what the Code prevents them from doing directly.”137
A second argument set forth by both courts and scholars is that releases
and injunctions are necessary to secure insider assistance and cooperation.
In other words, the debtor would suffer irreparable harm if the insiders
were tied up in litigation rather than directing their attention towards reorganization of the debtor.138 The idea is that insiders have the most knowledge about the inner workings of the debtor and are in the best position to
lead the reorganization. Courts have even granted releases to employees
who have left the company, reasoning that their cooperation is needed for
the reorganized entity’s pursuit of legal claims against others.139
The third main argument asserted for granting releases or injunctions to
insiders, and the most common situation in which they are granted,140 is the
“contributing nondebtor theory.” Releases or injunctions are granted in exchange for payments to the debtor in order to fund the reorganization.141
b.

Arguments Against Allowing Releases or Injunctions to Insiders

Many courts and scholars have argued that there is no pressing need to
obtain the release of insiders’ indemnity and contribution claims against the
debtor.142 For matured indemnity claims—claims on which an insider is
136. See Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A. H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 702 (4th Cir.
1989) (noting that entire reorganization hinges “on [the] debtor being free from indirect
claims such as suits against parties who would have indemnity or contribution claims
against the debtor”).
137. Judith R. Starr, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction to Release Insiders from Creditor
Claims in Corporate Reorganizations, 9 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 485, 493 (1993).
138. Id. at 497 (citing SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham
Lambert Grp., Inc.), 130 B.R. 910, 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992);
Otero Mills, Inc. v. Sec. Bank & Trust (In re Otero Mills, Inc.), 21 B.R. 777, 778-79 (Bankr.
D.N.M. 1982), aff’d, 25 B.R. 1018 (D.N.M.)).
139. Id. (citing Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 130 B.R. at 928).
140. Id. at 498.
141. But see A. H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d at 702 (finding insiders’ $10 million contribution
to the plan not to be substnatial enough for release, contrary to bankruptcy court’s holding).
142. See, e.g., THOMAS J. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 23-25
(1986) (arguing that the policy behind bankruptcy law is to approve a reorganization plan
only where the value of the debtor to creditors and shareholders, taking into account all of
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jointly liable with the debtor—the insider’s claim against the estate is subject to various qualifications.143 Section 502(e)(1)(A) of the Code provides
that if a claim is not allowable against the debtor, any claim for contribution or reimbursement from the disallowed claim must also be disallowed.144 In addition, section 509(c) provides that if the underlying claim
is an allowed claim against the estate,145 the insider’s claim will be subordinated to that allowed claim until the claimant has been paid in full.146
Lastly, courts have consistently disallowed claims for indemnity or contribution that are inconsistent with substantive non-bankruptcy law.147 In addition, the Code renders contingent indemnity claims—“indemnity claims
based only on the potential liability of the insider to a third party”—
worthless if they do not mature prior to confirmation and discharge.148
Courts that base injunctions on the need for insider assistance and cooperation often make no findings of the extent of harm the debtor will suffer,
the likelihood of the insider refusing to cooperate, or the lack of legal methods to obtain the insider’s cooperation.149 When courts require insiders
to do so, they often are unable to demonstrate the probability of irreparable
harm to the debtor without their cooperation or assistance.150 In addition,
companies outside of the bankruptcy context are able to function when
faced with litigation, so some argue there is no reason to think that companies in bankruptcy are any less capable of dealing with the effects of litiga-

the risks, exceeds the value in liquidation); Starr, supra note 137, at 494 n.54 (“To the extent
that claims against insiders are so significant and intertwined with claims against the debtor
that they threaten the debtor’s ability to reorganize, reorganization may not be a feasible alternative to liquidation. In this scenario, the bankruptcy court would not be acting to protect
its jurisdiction by enjoining litigation against insiders but would be stacking the deck in favor of a reorganization, when the real world equities favored a liquidation.”).
143. See Starr, supra note 137, at 494.
144. 11 U.S.C. § 502(e)(1)(A) (2006); see also Baldwin-United Corp., 55 B.R. 885, 89394 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985).
145. See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (explains the allowance of claims).
146. 11 U.S.C. § 509(c); see also Baldwin-United Corp., 55 B.R. at 895.
147. See, e.g., Gillman v. Cont’l Airlines (In re Cont’l Airlines), 203 F.3d 203, 215-16
(3d Cir. 2000) (finding indemnification by the debtor not available for securities law violations on the part of officers and directors of the debtor); Baldwin-United Corp., 55 B.R. at
902-03 (disallowing indemnity claims arising from securities fraud suits because indemnity
is not permissible under securities law).
148. See Starr, supra note 137, at 495.
149. Id. at 497.
150. See, e.g., JRT, Inc. v. TCBY Sys., Inc. (In re JRT, Inc.), 121 B.R. 314, 320 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1990); Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Am. Sterilizer Co. (In re Univ. Med. Ctr.), 82 B.R.
754, 758 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); Aboussie Bros. Const. Co. v. United Mo. Bank (In re Aboussie Bros. Constr. Co.), 8 B.R. 302, 304 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
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tion.151 Lastly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure serve two important
functions in this context by protecting certain employees from “unduly
burdensome litigation demands” and enabling the reorganized entity to obtain information from unwilling former insiders.152
Professor Barry L. Zaretsky argued that if the debtor is the officer’s best
employment opportunity, then he will remain with the debtor.153 If it is
not, the officer will leave the debtor regardless of whether he receives a
discharge.154 Professor Zaretsky explained that “unless the officer irrationally intends to disregard his own self-interest in favor of destroying the
debtor, courts should treat threats to ‘throw in the towel’ as nothing more
than empty threats.”155 Others have gone even further in urging that these
individuals should not be able to gain releases or injunctions because they
likely played an important role in driving the debtor into bankruptcy.156
Critics of insider releases and injunctions have adamantly opposed the
theory under which these releases and injunctions are most often granted—
the contributing nondebtor theory. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor
must disclose all of its assets and submit these assets to the court’s control.
In exchange, the court can force creditors to take a pro rata distribution and
prevent them from taking further action through the discharge provisions.157 Courts outside of bankruptcy have no power to force claimants to
accept monetary settlements that the claimants believe are inadequate.158

151. “Non-bankrupt companies cope with the disruptive effects of litigation on a regular
basis and there is no reason to assume that reorganized companies are any less able to do
so.” Starr, supra note 137, at 497 (citing In re Keyco, Inc., 49 B.R. 507, 510 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1985)).
152. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37 (governing discovery in civil proceedings in federal
courts).
153. See Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays, supra note 35, at 272.
154. Id.
155. Id. “Bankruptcy court is simply not an appropriate forum for stopping the clock on
a principal’s life in an effort to retain his undivided energy and attention.” Id. at 230.
156. See, e.g., Peter M. Boyle, Note, Non-Debtor Liability in Chapter 11: Validity of
Third-Party Discharge in Bankruptcy, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 421, 447 (1992) (“Bribing a
corporate officer with a discharge in order to secure that officer’s assistance in a reorganization, when that officer presumably played a role in the debtor’s financial demise, is not an
equitable solution particularly when such discharge will impair the rights or claims of creditors. The officer’s assistance may be desirable and in certain circumstances necessary, but
the threat, either expressed or implied, of ‘throwing in the towel’ is tantamount to extortion,
and an extortionist does not deserve equitable relief even if that relief may benefit the debtor.”).
157. See Starr, supra note 137, at 498 (“It is the acceptance of this burden by the debtor,
together with the economic reality that a debtor in bankruptcy cannot pay all claims against
it in full, which form the basis for the extraordinary power of the court to force a creditor to
accept less than full value for its claim.”).
158. Id.
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Judith Starr, formerly Senior Counsel to the Securities and Exchange
Commission,159 questions why courts allow a solvent insider to take the
benefits of bankruptcy because of his relationship with the debtor, by forcing a claimant to accept a less than adequate settlement, when he does not
have to accept the burdens of the Code such as disclosing all of his assets
and submitting them to the control of the bankruptcy court.160
Opponents of insider releases and injunctions also argue that they undermine the policy behind joint and several liability, and may present a
moral hazard to insiders looking to shield themselves from personal liability.161 The rationale behind joint and several liability is to ensure that victims are fully compensated in the event one or more of the tortfeasors is
unable to pay.162 An officer or director is liable for her tortious conduct
even though the conduct may have been in furtherance of the company’s
interests and within the scope of employment.163 This may incentivize insiders to bring the debtor into bankruptcy in order to avoid personal liability.164
2.

Should Debtors’ Insurers Be Granted Nondebtor Releases or
Injunctions?

The debtor’s insurance is often one of the primary assets for certain
types of claimants, such as personal injury claimants, who may be able to
recover a greater amount of their claim from the insurance company than
the debtor.165 An insurer may be considered a co-debtor since the insurer

159. Id. at 485.
160. Id. at 498.
161. See, e.g., id. (“A moral hazard is present because insiders may be tempted to engage
in high risk behavior by the knowledge that they can protect themselves from its consequences by taking the corporation into chapter 11. This protection from liability may tempt
insiders to take the corporation into chapter 11 in circumstances where they otherwise
would not do so.”).
162. See Boyle, supra note 156, at 444.
163. See e.g., Inforex, Inc. v. Burridge (In re Inforex, Inc.), 26 B.R. 515, 518 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1983).
164. A. H. Robins and Johns-Manville both involved allegations that corporate management brought the company into Chapter 11 in an effort to limit their own liability. See Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A. H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 702 (4th Cir. 1989); MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 36 B.R. 727, 730 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 837 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988); see also SOBOL, supra note 90, at 327 (noting
that both companies were solvent at the time of filing, but the courts held that if a company
foresees insolvency, the company does not have to wait until it is actually insolvent to file.
In the case of A. H. Robins, the bankruptcy petition was alleged to be a tactic to consolidate
all of the Dalkon Shield litigation before a judge thought to be more sympathetic to the debtor).
165. See Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 18, at 373.
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has contracted to fund the debtor’s obligations with its own funds to the extent those obligations are covered under the insurance policy.166 As noted
previously, co-debtors are not covered by the automatic stay, so claimants
may attempt to recover by pursuing the debtor’s insurer directly.167 The
claimants’ success depends in part on whether the court treats the insurance
proceeds as property of the estate.168
Most courts treat liability insurance proceeds as property of the estate.169
The bankruptcy court, therefore, has the power to control the equitable distribution of the proceeds to all creditors,170 and the automatic stay prevents
creditors from recovering this property outside the bankruptcy proceeding.171 If proceeds of an insurance policy are not considered property of
the estate, the insurance company may be directly liable to the victims.172
Issues arise when the insurer’s liability, which is limited by the terms of the
policy, does not cover the amount of all of the claims.173 Since the insurance proceeds will be distributed according to non-bankruptcy law, a race
to the proceeds may ensue.174
Unique problems arise in relation to equitable distribution of insurance
proceeds when there are claims that “have not yet matured or when some
claims have not been reduced to judgment.”175 Future claimants rights to
insurance proceeds and the protections afforded to future claimants in
bankruptcy proceedings will be addressed in more detail in Part III.176
166. See id. at 383.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
168. See Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 18, at 384 (“[T]he extent to which the
bankruptcy court has the power to oversee the allocation of insurance proceeds among claimants, and to prevent a race to recover those proceeds, depends in large part on whether the
insurance proceeds become property of the estate.”).
169. See id. at 395; Silverstein, supra note 84, at 27-28; see also H.R. REP. NO. 595, at
367-68 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963 (noting Congress intentionally construed the language “property of the estate” broadly).
170. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006).
171. 11 U.S.C. § 362.
172. See Owaski v. Jet Fla. Sys., Inc. (In re Jet Fla. Sys., Inc.), 883 F.2d 970, 973 (11th
Cir. 1989) (holding claimants are not precluded from proceeding against debtor by section
524(e) where claimant is ultimately trying to collect from the debtor’s insurer). Even if insurance proceeds are not treated as property of the estate, the court may still exercise control
over the proceeds through its equitable powers. This would require affirmative action on
behalf of the trustee to obtain an injunction to prevent distributional problems. See Zaretsky,
Insurance Proceeds, supra note 18, at 401 (“In effect, then, a bankruptcy court could provide sufficient protection to a debtor and its insurers even if the insurance proceeds were not
considered property of the estate.”).
173. See Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays, supra note 35, at 276.
174. See Boyle, supra note 156, at 449.
175. Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 18, at 405.
176. See infra Part III.A.
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Arguments for Granting Releases and Injunctions to Insurers

Some courts are willing to grant releases to debtors’ insurers that agree
to contribute to the plan of the reorganization.177 This is based on the contributing nondebtor theory discussed earlier in relation to insiders.178 For
Chapter 11 debtors facing mass tort claims or securities class actions, various courts have released insurance companies in exchange for contributing
funds to a trust upon which the plaintiffs could draw.179
b.

Arguments Against Granting Releases and Injunctions to Insurers

When there is no dispute as to the distribution of insurance proceeds,
scholars argue that the non-bankruptcy policy goal of satisfying tort claimants in a timely manner favors less interference from the courts.180 Under
those circumstances, incentivizing an insurance company to contribute to a
plan of reorganization in exchange for a release is misguided because the
results will be the same whether the claimants recover inside or outside of
bankruptcy, and the debtor does not gain a benefit either.
Another argument asserted by courts and scholars opposed to releasing
insurance companies in exchange for contributing to the plan is that insurance companies are simply fulfilling contractual obligations by paying out
the amount due under the terms of the insurance policy.181

177. See, e.g., MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837
F.2d 89, 90 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that insurer’s funding of claimants fund in exchange for
discharge of liabilities was a “cornerstone” of the reorganization); UNARCO Bloomington
Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., 124 B.R. 268, 278 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (upholding discharge of
insurance company that funded the reorganization, but indicating that discharge would not
be appropriate for insurers that did not settle and contribute proceeds to the reorganization).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 140-141.
179. See, e.g., Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 90-91 (third party insurer channeled
$770 million settlement fund); SOBOL, supra note 90, at 219 (A. H. Robins’ reorganization
plan provided for a contribution of unused insurance proceeds from the third party insurer).
180. See Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 18, at 414-15.
However, when multiple claimants seek insurance proceeds that appears [sic] to
be insufficient to satisfy the claims, the problem of equitable distribution of the
debtor’s assets among claimants arises and may outweigh the nonbankruptcy interest in timely satisfaction of claims. In that event, the bankruptcy court may assert jurisdiction over the policy proceeds, both during and, if necessary, after the
close of a bankruptcy case, in order to enforce an equitable distribution of the
proceeds among the claimants.
Id. at 415.
181. See, e.g., In re Mahoney Hawkes, LLP, 289 B.R. 285, 300-01 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2002) (ruling that an insurance company’s payment to the estate under the debtor’s policy
did not constitute a “substantial contribution” for purposes of satisfying the Master Mortgage test because the insurance company was just fulfilling its contractual obligation).

GAMBLE_CHRISTENSEN

2011]

4/9/2011 8:17 PM

NONDEBTOR RELEASES

847

III. THE LIMITED POWER OF BANKRUPTCY COURTS TO GRANT
NONDEBTOR RELEASES AND INJUNCTIONS
It is my view that bankruptcy courts do have the authority to grant nondebtor third party releases and injunctions. As discussed previously, section 105(a) grants the bankruptcy courts broad equitable powers in carrying
out the provisions of the Code.182 Further statutory authority is found in
section 1123(b)(6), which provides that a plan may contain “any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this
title.”183 And, Bankruptcy Rule 3016(c) indicates that Congress may have
considered nondebtor injunctions because the rule states that if a plan provides for an injunction not specifically authorized in the Code, such provision and the affected parties must be identified in the plan and disclosure
statement.184 While section 524(e) has been cited by anti-release courts
and academics as a statutory limit on the authority of bankruptcy courts to
grant nondebtor third party releases,185 this section does not expressly limit
bankruptcy courts’ authority to approve nondebtor third party releases.
Section 524(e) states that “discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect
the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for,
such debt.”186 As the Seventh Circuit reasoned in a recent case, if Congress intended to limit this authority, it could have “used mandatory terms
such as ‘shall’ or ‘will’ rather than the definitional term ‘does.’”187 Although section 524(e) clearly should not be read as an automatic release of
co-obligors, it does not prohibit a bankruptcy court from taking separate action under its equitable powers to grant these releases.
A 2009 United States Supreme Court decision, in dicta, approved of
bankruptcy courts’ authority to confirm a plan with a third party release.188
In Travelers, the Supreme Court revisited the approval of the settlement between Johns-Manville and its insurers, which released the insurers from all
tort liability in exchange for a contribution by the insurance companies of
$770 million to the plan.189 When asbestos tort claimants attempted to
bring action against the insurers sixteen years later, the bankruptcy court

182. See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2006); supra note 58 and accompanying text.
183. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(6); supra note 58 and accompanying text.
184. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3016(c); supra note 59 and accompanying text.
185. See supra Part II.A.2.
186. 11 U.S.C. § 524(e).
187. Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC (In re Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc.), 519 F.3d 640,
656 (7th Cir. 2008).
188. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 129 S. Ct. 2195 (2009).
189. Id. at 2199.
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enjoined the action.190 The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the
bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction, noting that “the Bankruptcy Court
plainly had jurisdiction to interpret and enforce its own jurisdiction to interpret and enforce its own prior orders.”191 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court implied that the bankruptcy court initially had authority to approve
the third party release and injunction.192
Having come to the conclusion that bankruptcy courts do have the authority to grant nondebtor releases and injunctions, I will now argue that
this power should be used only in very rare circumstances.
A. Policy Considerations Dictate that Injunctions and Releases Be
Granted to Insurance Companies in Mass Tort and Class Action
Cases, Subject to Several Caveats
Under certain circumstances, insurers should be granted releases or injunctions against future suits because doing so will aid the debtor’s reorganization and will promote the fair and equitable distribution of assets to
creditors.193 There is a unique need for nondebtor releases and injunctions
in class actions and mass tort cases. When insurance proceeds do not cover
all potential claims, issues arise. If the insurance proceeds are not considered “property of the estate,” there will be a race to the proceeds and the
insurance company will simply pay out the proceeds on a first-come, firstserved basis. This leaves some claimants paid in full and others without
any form of compensation or redress.194 Thus, it is best to bring the policy
proceeds into the bankruptcy proceeding, and an efficient way in which to
do this is by channeling the proceeds into a claimants trust. Even when insurance proceeds are considered “property of the estate,” it is best to channel the funds into a trust so that the insurance proceeds are available to the
victim claimants and not to the general body of creditors.195

190. Id. at 2201.
191. Id. at 2205.
192. See Joan N. Feeney, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 11A:58 (5th ed. 2010).
193. Tort claimants are not considered creditors by all courts, however they will be included in the definition of creditors for the argument in this Note.
194. See, e.g., Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dodd, 416 F. Supp. 1216, 1219 (D. Md. 1976),
aff’d, 568 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1978) (insurer is not required to wait until all claimants come
forward before distributing proceeds).
195. See, e.g., Boyle, supra, note 156, at 448-49 (noting that an interesting effect of including insurance proceeds within the Code’s definition of “property of the estate” is that
the proceeds become available to “non-victim creditors”). These creditors are essentially
granted a windfall as they would otherwise not have access to the insurance proceeds.
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Mass tort cases196 present a unique problem for bankruptcy courts in part
because of the need to protect the interests of future claimants. Asbestos
claimants and other personal injury claimants may be unaware of their injuries for years, and there is a danger that the Chapter 11 debtor will receive a
discharge from liability well before some claimants’ injuries are even
known.197 By creating a claimants trust, future claimants’ interests can best
be protected. The trust, funded in part by insurance proceeds, but often also with a percentage of the reorganized entity’s profits, as well as equity in
the reorganized entity, can continue to pay out claims as claimants become
aware of their injuries.
Circuit courts that have dealt with Chapter 11 debtors facing mass tort
and class action litigation have found occasion to grant the debtor’s insurers releases in exchange for channeling insurance proceeds into a claimants
fund.198 Going forward, bankruptcy courts confronted with mass tort litigation and class actions that pose insurmountable challenges to a reorganization plan should consider granting releases to insurers who will agree to
contribute to a claimants fund, subject to several caveats. These caveats
are discussed next.
First, the insurer must contribute some additional value to the plan of reorganization beyond what it is contractually obligated to provide. This
may be in the form of a monetary contribution above and beyond what the
insurer is contractually obligated to pay under the policy, a promise by the
insurer not to litigate whether the claims are actually covered under the policy, or preferably, both. Debtor’s insurers will often dispute whether
claims are covered.199 The court must determine whether there is in fact a
good faith dispute or whether the insurer is raising a non-meritorious defense. If the insurer’s defense is meritless, the court should deny the release or injunction to the insurer because the insurer is simply tying the
debtor up in costly litigation. If the insurer’s assertion is made in good
faith, the court should consider granting a release or injunction to the insurer in exchange for its contribution to the plan. Assets of the estate will not

196. Securities litigation class actions do not raise the same issues because the claimants
are generally known.
197. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 93.
198. See, e.g., Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A. H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 696
(4th Cir. 1989) (third party insurer contributed assets to a claimants fund); MacArthur Co. v.
Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 90 (2d Cir. 1988) (third
party insurer contributed $770 million to a claimants fund).
199. See, e.g., Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Fibreboard Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1368, 1369 (N.D. Cal.
1991), aff’d, 953 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 399 (1992) (insurer brought
an action seeking declaratory judgment that it was not obligated to indemnify asbestos manufacturer for punitive damages awarded to personal injury claimants by juries in two states).

GAMBLE_CHRISTENSEN

850

4/9/2011 8:17 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXVIII

be wasted litigating with the insurer over whether the claims actually fall
within the insurance policy. The time that is saved by eliminating litigation
between the debtor and its insurers will benefit both the debtor, which will
be able to focus on the reorganization, and tort claimants, who will be able
to recover more quickly for their injuries. In A. H. Robins, Aetna initially
disputed whether the claims were covered under the policy, but ultimately
agreed not only to contribute all of the remaining product liability insurance proceeds to the trust for the benefit of the Dalkon Shield victims, but
also to cover an additional $100 million in outlier insurance and $250 million in excess insurance in exchange for a release from future liability.200 If
this additional value is not secured from the insurer, the insurer would gain
a release without providing adequate consideration. The additional contribution will be beneficial to the debtor because it will increase the value of
the debtor’s estate; this, in turn, will benefit creditors through a larger return on their claims.
Second, bankruptcy courts should consider granting claimants an option
to opt out of the settlement and to pursue their claims against the insurer
separately. To use the case of A. H. Robins again as an example, the Dalkon Shield victims were given an option to opt out of the settlement so that
they could pursue claims against their medical providers and Aetna.201 An
opt-out provision is important because it protects claimants’ due process
rights. At the same time, however, courts need to consider whether an insurer will be willing to contribute to the plan of reorganization if the insurer
is not assured of a cap on its liability. Claimants who opt out may attempt
to recover punitive damages from the insurer, which could deter insurers
from agreeing to an opt-out provision. The A. H. Robins court handled this
issue by allowing Dalkon Shield victims that opted out of the settlement to
recover only compensatory damages (not punitive) from Aetna.202
Although bankruptcy courts have the power to grant releases to insurance companies in these situations, it is a power that should be exercised
with great care. Not every Chapter 11 reorganization is successful and
bankruptcy courts must find only by a preponderance of the evidence that a

200. A. H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d at 701 n.6; cf. In re Mahoney Hawkes, LLP, 289 B.R.
285, 300 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (holding that an insurance company’s payment to the estate under the debtor’s policy did not constitute substantial contribution for purposes of satisfying the Master Mortgage test because the insurance company was just fulfilling its contractual obligation).
201. A. H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d at 701 & n.7 (noting that of 110,000 class B claims, only
2960 exercised their right to opt out).
202. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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plan is “feasible.”203 Risk is high in mass tort cases where the value of tort
claims is unknown; for example, in Johns-Manville, far more individuals
filed personal injury claims than anticipated and the litigation trust that was
set up was eventually able to pay only five percent of a claim’s value.204
Bankruptcy courts, therefore, should be exceedingly cautious in using section 105 powers to approve Chapter 11 plans containing channeling injunctions and releases of debtors’ insurers.
B.

Policy Considerations and a Changing Landscape Dictate that
Releases and Injunctions Not Be Granted to Debtors’ Insiders

Although asbestos mass tort litigation may for the most part be behind
us, the bankruptcy courts have certainly not been granted any reprieve. In
the face of a crippling recession, 89,402 companies filed for bankruptcy in
2009, thirty-eight percent more than in 2008.205 The year 2009 ushered in
a fifty percent increase in the number of public companies filing for bankruptcy from 2008, the highest number since 2002.206 The number of large
companies, with $1 billion in assets or more, that filed was also fifty percent higher than in 2008.207 The year 2009 witnessed the filings of some of
the largest Chapter 11 cases ever: General Motors Corporation, Chrysler
LLC, CIT Group, Inc., and General Growth Properties, Inc., to name just a
few.208 These mammoth filings followed the largest corporate bankruptcy
in American history, the failure of the Wall Street investment bank Lehman
Brothers.209
1. Shift Towards Pre-Arranged Bankruptcies and Use of Turnaround
Management Renders the Insider Assistance and Cooperation Justification
for Insider Releases and Injunctions Moot
Not only has there been a boom in large public company Chapter 11 filings in recent years, there seems to be a fundamental shift, for many, in the

203. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2006) (laying out the feasibility requirement, that a
Chapter 11 reorganization plan cannot be confirmed if it is likely to result in “liquidation, or
the need for further financial reorganization of the debtor or its successors”).
204. See Silverstein, supra note 84, at 82-83 (citing Findley v. Trs. of Manville Pers. Injury Settlement Trust (In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 237 F. Supp. 2d 297, 303
(E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
205. Michael J. de la Merced, 2009: A Banner Year for Bankruptcies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
10,
2010),
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/10/2009-a-banner-year-forbankruptcies.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See id.
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Chapter 11 bankruptcy process. Large public companies are increasingly
taking advantage of alternatives to the traditional reorganization process.210
Prepackaged business bankruptcies (“prepacks”) and “363 sales,” named
for section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, are both methods of prearranging
reorganization, or at least a portion of the reorganization, prior to filing the
Chapter 11 petition.
“A prepack ‘is negotiated and accepted prior to the filing of a Chapter 11
case but . . . is approved and confirmed by the court in a subsequently filed
Chapter 11 case.’”211 In a prepack, creditors are solicited and the votes are
obtained prior to the filing. One of the main benefits of a prepack is the
speed with which a debtor can enter and exit the bankruptcy process.212
CIT Group, Inc. filed a prepack on November 1, 2009 and emerged from
bankruptcy just forty days later with $10.5 billion less in debt.213 This contrasts sharply with the twelve to thirty-six months required for a normal
Chapter 11 reorganization.214 Recent trends have also shown a rise in the
number of quick sales of debtor assets, enabling the business to restart under new ownership.215 Commonly referred to as “363 sales,” Chrysler LLC
and others have taken advantage of this alternative to the traditionally lengthy reorganization process.216

210. Mike Spector, Quickie Bankruptcy Filings: Companies Zoom In, Zoom Out, WALL
ST.
J.
(Jan.
5,
2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704789404574636164199387026.html
(“In 2009, the number of prearranged bankruptcies, in which many creditors approve a reorganization plan ahead of a filing, tripled to 30 among publicly traded companies compared
with the year before . . . .”).
211. Rhett G. Campbell, Prepacks Reduce Time and Costs of Business Filings, NAT’L
L.J. (Mar. 5, 2007), available at http://www.tklaw.com/resources/documents/Rhett%20
Campbell_National%20Law%20Journal_Prepacks%20Reduce%20Time%20and%20Costs
%20of%20Business%20Fiilings.pdf (quoting 4 WILLIAM L. NORTON, NORTON BANKRUPTCY
LAW & PRACTICE 2D § 86:1 (2007)).
212. Id. (“Speed is a prepack’s primary benefit.”).
213. See Spector, supra note 210.
214. See Campbell, supra note 211 (“The average business bankruptcy in 2005 required
19.5 months to reach confirmation . . . .”).
215. See William J. Burnett, Trustee Talk in Troubled Times: A Conversation About
Commercial Chapter 7 Cases and the Role of Trustee’s Counsel During the Great Recession, ASPATORE 1 (Mar. 2010), available at 2010 WL 895206.
216. See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 37 n.2
(2008) (debtor filed a Chapter 11 liquidation plan after selling substantially all of its assets
as a going concern pursuant to section 363(b)(1)); In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 96
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“A debtor may sell substantially all of its assets as a going concern
and later submit a plan of liquidation providing for the distribution of the proceeds of the
sale. This strategy is employed, for example, when there is a need to preserve the going
concern value because revenues are not sufficient to support the continued operation of the
business and there are no viable sources for financing.”).
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Additional changes have occurred in recent years that further problematize the practice of granting releases to Chapter 11 debtor insiders. After the
Enron scandal, followed closely by the failures of Worldcom, Inc. and
Adelphia Communications, actions of insiders became headline news.217
Although the Bankruptcy Code allows for the appointment of a trustee to
take the place of the debtor-in-possession, no one made this motion in the
Enron Corporation case, and Ken Lay and other insiders were given time to
appoint their own replacement management.218 Partly in response to the
failure to appoint a trustee in the Enron case, the 2005 Amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code attempted to encourage courts and the U.S. Trustee’s office to appoint trustees in more Chapter 11 cases.219 Under the new
amendments, the U.S. Trustee is required to move for appointment of a
trustee “if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that current [management] . . . participated in actual fraud, dishonesty, or criminal conduct.”220
In addition, the bankruptcy court may replace the debtor-in-possession (i.e.,
the management of the debtor) with a trustee if it “is in the best interests of
creditors and the estate.”221 Going forward, existing management may
more and more frequently be replaced by trustees.
Recent cases also indicate a surge in the use of Turnaround Management
(TM) Specialists. TM temporarily takes over the business in order to restructure and reorganize the company.222 TM served as trustees and as
consensual replacement for management in some of the largest recent reorganizations.223
Although the concern always existed that current management was responsible for driving the company into bankruptcy and thus should not be
trusted with its reorganization, these recent changes give additional reasons
not to view current management as necessary to the reorganization, and
therefore, not entitled to releases or injunctions. As previously noted, one
reason asserted for granting releases to insiders was to secure the insider’s
continued support under the assumption that the insider had the most knowledge about the company and was best able to lead the reorganization.224

217. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS 436 (6th ed. 2008).
218. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 147 (2005).
219. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 217.
220. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(e) (2006).
221. Id. § 1104(a)(3).
222. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 217, at 438.
223. See id.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 138-139; see also H.R. REP. NO. 595, at 6192
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963 (“[V]ery often the creditors will be benefitted
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But now, with large corporate debtors bringing in turnaround specialists,
insider cooperation and assistance is a less pressing concern. A study focusing on large corporate Chapter 11 filings in 2001 found that seventy
percent of CEOs were replaced within the two years preceding the filing.225
“This represents a sharp increase over comparable figures reported in previous studies and suggests strongly that Chapter 11 does not provide a safe
harbor for entrenched managers.”226 Between 1990 and the early 2000s,
CEO turnover rates in bankruptcy increased sixty-five percent.227 And, for
entrenched managers, meaning those with significant equity holdings, the
turnover rate increased by more than 200 percent.228 Including the two
year post-filing period increases the proportion of CEOs replaced from seventy to eighty percent, although this is likely an underestimation because
the researchers did not systematically collect post-petition data.229 These
statistics suggest that debtors find that the incremental benefit of keeping
existing management in place outweighed by the benefits of bringing in
new management. It follows that securing existing management’s cooperation and assistance with the plan of reorganization is no longer, and may
never have been, a valid reason for granting a release.
In addition, the trend towards pre-packaged bankruptcies and 363 sales
places insiders in a position adverse to that of creditors. There is a heightened concern that insiders will not act in the best interests of creditors or
the estate. Creditors often prefer prearranged bankruptcies because the
creditors are able to recover more quickly and they avoid the risk of any
further decline in the company’s value. Insiders, on the other hand, may
prefer traditional Chapter 11 reorganizations because not only are they able
to keep their jobs, but they stand to benefit further if the company is able to
rebound over the course of the reorganization. Insiders may act out of selfinterest in guiding the debtor into a traditional reorganization and bypass a
more efficient and effective pre-arranged bankruptcy. The misalignment of
insiders’ and creditors’ interests provides yet another reason not to grant
releases and injunctions to insiders.

by continuation of the debtor-in-possession, both because the expense of a trustee will not
be required, and the debtor, who is familiar with his business, will be better able to operate it
during the reorganization case.”).
225. Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 513 (2009).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 516.
228. Id. at 516.
229. Id. at 552. Ayotte and Morrison attribute this change to increased control of bankruptcies by creditors. Id. at 516.
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2. Shift Towards Pre-Arranged Bankruptcies and Use of Turnaround
Management Renders the Contributing Nondebtor Justification for Insider
Releases and Injunctions Moot
Another reason asserted by courts and scholars for granting insiders releases is the contributing nondebtor theory—the idea that insiders should
be granted releases in exchange for substantial monetary contribution to the
plan.230 This justification is weak for several reasons.
First, part of the traditional justification for the contributing nondebtor
theory is to give insiders an equity interest in the company that would encourage the insiders to make the reorganized company as successful as
possible. As recent statistics demonstrate, however, large corporations are
not retaining old management, so the need to obtain this incentive structure
is no longer a viable justification for releasing an insider.
Second, there have always been concerns that the amount of the monetary contribution did not support a full release of all personal liability, and
in response, some courts showed reluctance to accept this justification.231
The court risks releasing an insider from liability that far exceeds the
amount of the monetary contribution to the plan. If the debtor is jointly liable with the insider, the debtor is then faced with potentially footing the
bill for claimants who are enjoined from asserting claims against the insider.
Related to this second point is the idea that an insider’s willingness to
contribute to a plan of reorganization is not a reliable measure of a company’s going concern value, and as discussed previously, a goal of bankruptcy is to rehabilitate only those companies with going concern value and to
liquidate the rest.232 Insiders’ willingness to commit their own funds is not
a good measure of going concern value because an insider’s judgment may
be clouded by sentimental reasons that do not comport with the actual viability of the company, including the desire to save jobs, an admirable but
potentially unrealistic goal. This is particularly prevalent in Chapter 11 filings of smaller companies. It may be better for creditors of these smaller
debtors to allow the company to be liquidated and go after the insider personally for the balance of their unpaid claims, for example, if the insider
guaranteed the companies debt. More importantly, the insider is essentially

230. See supra text accompanying notes 140-141.
231. Consider the example of A. H. Robins, where the Robins family received American
Home Products stock worth $385 million as a tax-free distribution on their A. H. Robins
stock under the reorganization plan in exchange for a mere $10 million contribution to the
plan; but, the Fourth Circuit subsequently found this amount not to be “substantial.” See supra notes 106-107, 110 and accompanying text.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
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buying her freedom from personal liability, so the price she is willing to
pay may not accurately reflect the likelihood that the company will succeed
as a going concern.
3. Need to Obtain Releases from Indemnity and Contribution Claims is
an Illusory Justification for Granting Insider Releases and Injunctions
As discussed earlier in this Note, commentators have aptly addressed the
many obstacles facing an insider seeking to obtain indemnification or contribution from the debtor.233 As these commentators suggest, the debtor is
no better off when it grants releases to insiders in exchange for obtaining a
release from indemnification or contribution claims by the insider. The
reason is that the debtor is only liable for a small number of allowed claims
on which it is a co-obligor, and even for those, the insider simply pays the
creditor and becomes a general unsecured creditor.234
4.

Two Caveats to Refusing Releases and Injunctions to Insiders:
Temporary Stays and Consensual Releases

As discussed in Part I, courts often temporarily enjoin creditors from asserting claims against individual officers, directors, and employees until the
plan is confirmed when claims would take insiders’ time and energy away
from focusing on the reorganization, and “in order to fully effectuate the
breathing spell from creditor actions that the automatic stay seeks to afford
the debtor.”235 A bankruptcy court may use its equitable powers to impose
a temporary nondebtor stay to the extent the stay will aid in the reorganization and ensure fair and equitable distribution to creditors. The Supreme
Court implicitly sanctioned temporary nondebtor stays in Celotex Corp. v.
Edwards.236
Temporary stays may in fact benefit the debtor and creditors, because
the debtor’s indemnification or contribution obligations are discharged
upon confirmation of the plan.237 If the insider is found liable after the plan
is confirmed, he or she is foreclosed from seeking contribution or indemnification from the debtor. For this reason, courts should be especially willing to grant temporary stays to insiders.

233. See supra text accompanying notes 143-152.
234. Id.
235. Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions, supra note 77, at 970, 970 n.42 (section
362(c)(2)(C) states that a “stay terminates upon grant of discharge in Chapter 11 case”).
236. 514 U.S 300 (1995).
237. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(e)(1)(B) (2006).
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Additionally, when a release or injunction is consensual, the bankruptcy
court need not stand in the way.238 This enables the creditors to exercise
their own discretion over what is in their best interests, without dragging
the bankruptcy court into the debate.239
CONCLUSION
Although bankruptcy courts do have the authority to approve Chapter 11
plans that contain nondebtor releases and injunctions, this power should be
exercised only under extraordinary circumstances.
If a debtor is faced with mass tort or class action litigation that threatens
to upend any attempt at reorganization, a debtor’s insurers may be released
from liability, but only if three conditions are met. First, there must be a
substantial risk that the proceeds the insurer is obligated to pay under the
policy will not cover the claims. Second, the insurer must contribute more
value than it is otherwise obligated to provide under the terms of the insurance agreement. Third, the insurer must contribute the funds to a claimants
trust that segregates them from those available to the general pool of creditors so that the ability of the victims of the mass tort or securities fraud to
recover on their claims is not disturbed by the overreaching of other creditors.
Public policy considerations and recent changes in the process by which
debtors attempt to reorganize weigh against granting insiders permanent
injunctions or releases. The increased utilization of prearranged bankrupt-

238. See Starr, supra note 137, at 501 (“When an insider release is a consensual provision, which a creditor may freely accept or reject, it is no different than any other settlement
and does not implicate section 524(e). The bankruptcy court simply exercises its umbrella
jurisdiction over the tripartite settlement among the insiders, the debtor, and the creditors.
The benefit-burden principle is respected because the insiders must offer sufficient inducement to creditors to achieve settlement, while retaining the risk of claims by objectors. The
moral hazard is eliminated because the insiders are not protected from the consequences of
prepetition acts by the ability to use the Code to force a discounted settlement on unwilling
creditors. Experience shows that the prospect of voluntary releases can be sufficient inducement for settlement and that such settlements fairly serve the interests of all parties . . .
in the reorganization.”).
239. See, e.g., In re AOV Indus., Inc., 31 B.R. 1005, 1008-09 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 792 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir.), vacated in part, 797 F.2d 1004 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (reorganization plan was funded by the two largest creditors who made funds available to other creditors who would grant them a release. No discharge was realized because
the creditors were free to reject the funds and maintain their claims.); In re Monroe Well
Serv. Inc., 80 B.R. 324, 329 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (explaining benefits to all parties from
plan providing for voluntary releases); Starr, supra note 137, at 500 (noting that insider releases given by creditors in exchange for consideration, where objecting creditors have the
opportunity to opt out, can effectively serve the interests of all parties involved in a reorganization without expanding the discharge power beyond the limits of its legislative grant).
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cies negates the need for insider assistance and cooperation since the plan
is arranged prior to the debtor filing the Chapter 11 petition. The use of
turnaround management and the replacement of insiders either prior to or
following the Chapter 11 filing indicate that large corporations do not see a
need to induce insiders to remain with the company by granting insiders releases in exchange for the contribution of new value. Lastly, this Note argues that commentators have been correct in asserting that the need to obtain releases from insiders for indemnity or contribution claims against the
debtor is an illusory justification. On the other hand, temporary as opposed
to permanent stays for insiders are largely unproblematic. Finally, bankruptcy courts may grant permanent releases or injunctions to insiders when
creditors give their consent.

